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INTRODUCTION
We live in a world of cyber-enabled, wireless devices 
that enhance many aspects of life, including treatment 
of diabetes. Type I Diabetes is a chronic autoimmune 
disorder characterized by the destruction of pancreatic 
B-cells and subsequent deficiency of insulin - a crucial
hormone in the regulation of blood glucose levels.
Implantable Medical Devices (IMD) are shrinking in
physical size which limits their memory, power, and
processing capacity resulting in the unsecure
transmission of data. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) has called for
encryption algorithms to be considered as the
lightweight cryptographic standard to combat these
vulnerabilities. In this poster, we analyze the power
consumption of a lightweight encryption candidate for
use in a continuous glucose monitor.
CONTINUOUS GLUCOSE 
MONITOR (CGM)
● Transmits blood glucose levels from the interstitial
fluid every 5 minutes
● Bluetooth Low Energy communication
● Limited battery, memory, and computing resources
● Sensors last ~10 days, Transmitters last ~90 days
 
 
Figure 1: The loop of diabetes treatment using a CGM, smartphone, and insulin pump
SECURITY GOALS
1) Cryptographic strength should be equal to or
comparable to round two candidates in the NIST
Lightweight Crypto Standardization project.
2) The power usage of the device cannot exceed the
max draw of the battery during encryption or regular
usage
3) The battery lifespan of a device using lightweight
encryption should be comparable to the device’s
default power consumption.
ForkAE
ForkAE is a lightweight authenticated encryption 
scheme optimized for short messages. Fork is a 
2nd-round candidate for the NIST Lightweight 
Cryptographic Standard. In [1], it is claimed that Fork 
is an appropriate cryptosystem for resource 
constrained devices including IMDs. Figure 2 depicts 
the mathematical structure of one round of Fork.
Figure 2: Structure of one round of Fork [2]
METHODS
We used an oscilloscope to record the current and 
voltage consumed by a Raspberry Pi 4B that computes a 
ciphertext of ForkSkinny-64-192 every .1 seconds for 10 
seconds. The voltage and current were used to analyze 
power consumption of the encryption. 
Figure 3: Raspberry Pi 4 configured for experimentation. 
DATA
Figure 4: Current draw of the Raspberry Pi without encryption
 
The graph above shows the current draw of the Raspberry Pi 
without computing ciphertexts. The variation in current indicates lots
of interference from the needs of the operating system. 
Figure 5: An overlay of  the current draw of the Raspberry Pi while computing ciphertexts of ForkAE compared to the control trial.
This graph is the current draw of the Pi while computing ciphertexts 
(orange) over the control trial from Figure 4. We see little variation 
between the trials indicating that the encryption has minimal power 
consumption.
CONCLUSION
In the test runs we performed we were able to 
perform encryption without exceeding the 
thresholds measured in the control run. Our data 
sets indicate a pattern that matches our 
expectations, but there is too much interference 
from the operating system to quantify the power 
consumption. The similarity in data between trials 
has a strong indication that the battery life of a 
CGM with ForkAE would be comparable to the 
device’s lifespan with default power consumption. 
FUTURE WORK
● Perform a similar test on hardware that is
resource constrained for a more accurate test
environment
● Compare the resource consumption of ForkAE
to other lightweight cryptographic algorithms
and AES
● Design a simplified version of ForkAE over
GF(52) in a 2x2 matrix to convert the block size
to 100 bits
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